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Abstract This paper examines changes in individual earnings during positive and negative growth 
periods in three Latin American economies: Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. We ask two major 
questions. First, do panel income changes favor the income recipients who started at the top of the 
income distribution (“divergent mobility”) or those who started at the bottom (“convergent 
mobility”)? And second, are the groups that are found to gain the most when the economy is 
growing those that are found to lose the most when the economy is contracting (“symmetry of 
mobility”) or is the pattern asymmetric in the sense that the same groups do best both in times of 
economic growth and in times of economic decline? We find support for the divergent mobility 
hypothesis only in scattered years in the cases of Mexico and Venezuela and no support at all in 
the case of Argentina. Rather, earnings mobility is most frequently convergent or neutral in all 
three countries. As for the symmetry of mobility hypothesis, we find that it is rejected in nearly all 
cases; rather, those groups that gain the most when the economy is growing are also the ones that 
gain the most or lose the least when the economy is contracting. Furthermore, we discuss how the 
absence of divergence reconciles with rising inequality in the countries under study. 
Keywords Earnings mobility • Income convergence • Latin America 
 
1 Motivation and Questions 
Who gains the most income when economies grow? Who loses the most income when economies 
contract? Are those groups that gain the most income in good times the ones that lose the most 
income in bad times? In this paper, we answer these questions for the changes in labor market 
earnings for three Latin American countries: Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. 
 The literature offers two distinct but complementary ways of answering questions like 
these. The more traditional way is to compare data from anonymous cross-sections. Exemplary of 
this tradition are Kuznets’s [23] seminal work relating inequality and growth and the literature on 
pro-poor growth and the development of growth incidence curves (e.g., [28]. These literatures are 
surveyed in [3]. More recently, a growing strand of work uses panel data to follow the same 
individuals or households over time and gauge changes in their economic circumstances; [21] 
provide a comprehensive overview. 
 The two types of analysis -anonymous cross sections and panel data - might produce the 
same qualitative results - for example, the anonymous rich gaining more than the anonymous poor 
and the panel rich gaining more than the panel poor - but this is not necessarily to be expected. To 
see why, consider a benchmark case and deviations from it. 
 Henry Aaron [1] famously said that watching the distribution of income change is “like 
watching the grass grow.” Picture, then, a process of economic growth which leaves the Lorenz 
curve unchanged or approximately so. Suppose that within an unchanged Lorenz curve, each 
income recipient were to keep the same position within the income distribution. In this case, the 
panel data would show the same percentage change in income for each panel person. And, of 
course, in a time of economic growth, the same percentage change for everyone would mean a 
larger gain in currency units (here, pesos in Argentina and Mexico, bolivares in Venezuela) for the 
people who started higher up in the income distribution than for those who started further down. 
Such a pattern would be what we call “divergent mobility” in real local currency units. 
 Researchers have many reasons to expect that most panel income changes would be fairly 
small: among them, most people deriving their incomes from the same sources over time, most 
people working in the same jobs from one year to the next, and most income sources yielding more 
or less the same incomes over time. Accordingly, nearly all quantile transition matrices have 
shown the majority of entries lying along the principal diagonal, with (in a quintile transition 
matrix) the (5,5) cell exhibiting the highest frequency and the (1,1) cell the second highest 
frequency. 
 As for the pattern of deviations from proportionality, numerous forces are at work, some 
going in one direction and some the other. Consider first those that lead to divergence. The theory 
of cumulative advantage posits that individuals with higher incomes and earnings in the base year 
experience the largest earnings gains [25]. Wealthier individuals’ ownership of physical and 
human capital, access to social and political connections, and greater ability to borrow and save, 
could all contribute to cumulative advantage. Complementing cumulative advantage in 
contributing to divergent mobility is the notion of poverty traps [5]. According to this theory, those 
individuals who lack a minimum level of human, physical, and social assets are consigned to a life 
in poverty from which they cannot escape. Yet another factor that may contribute to larger gains 
for the initially well-to-do compared with others is labor market twist. This idea holds that in an 
increasingly globalized and technology-dependent world, the demand for skills is outpacing the 
available supply, bidding up the earnings of skilled workers while lowering the relative earnings 
of the unskilled, with skill-biased technical change propelling individuals with the highest human 
and physical capital endowments ahead the most [2]. Together, the preceding factors reinforce one 
another, exemplifying positive feedback in changes in economic well-being, defined by Nobel 
laureate James Meade ([24], p. 155) as “self-reinforcing influences which help to sustain the good 
fortune of the fortunate and the bad fortune of the unfortunate.” 
 On the other hand, there are also reasons to expect convergent income changes. For life 
cycle reasons, young people will disproportionately experience income gains and older people 
income losses. Some people are casual employees, working some days and weeks and not others; 
whether one has work is one source of instability. Other working people are regularly engaged in 
work in which unstable earnings are the norm, and these people do well some of the time and badly 
some of the time. And in a segmented labor market, some people have the good fortune of being 
able to move up out of the poorer jobs and into better ones while others have the exact opposite 
experience. 
 In sum, the benchmark case (approximately unchanged Lorenz curves, little movement 
within the income distribution) could hold but it need not. Divergent and convergent forces are 
pulling in opposite directions. 
 So far, we have discussed the case of positive economic growth. Economic growth is 
positive in most countries most of the time, but what if economic growth is negative? Again, 
suppose that the Lorenz curve remains unchanged and that each income recipient keeps the same 
position in the income distribution as before. In times of economic decline, the income losses 
would be largest in pesos or bolivares for those who started highest in the income distribution 
compared to those who started further down - the exact opposite of what would be encountered in 
times of economic growth. We term the opposing patterns in times of positive and negative 
economic growth symmetry of mobility. But some of the factors mentioned above - in particular, 
cumulative advantage, poverty traps, and labor market twist - work in the other direction; in other 
words, Meade’s positive feedback influences operate so that those who started ahead remain ahead 
even in times of economic decline, leading to asymmetry of mobility. 
 We thus have two major questions. First, do panel income changes favor the income 
recipients who started at the top of the income distribution (divergent mobility) or those who 
started at the bottom (convergent mobility)? And second, are the groups that are found to gain the 
most when the economy is growing those that are found to lose the most when the economy is 
contracting (symmetry of mobility) or is the pattern asymmetric in the sense that the same groups 
do best both in times of economic growth and in times of economic decline? 
 
2 Contributions to the empirical literature on Latin America 
This paper uses panel data to answer the divergent/convergent mobility question and the 
symmetry/asymmetry of mobility question for three Latin American economies: Argentina, 
Mexico, and Venezuela. We study the variations in patterns of individual earnings changes over a 
large number of one-year panels in each of the three countries. In most but not all years covered 
by this study, economic growth was positive; and in several years, the relative inequality of 
earnings rose, in our three countries and in Latin America as a whole [16]. Given these 
macroeconomic changes and given our sense that most people remain approximately where they 
were within the income distribution, we expect to find two patterns in panel data: first, that panel 
earnings changes would be divergent in percentages on several occasions, and second that panel 
earnings changes would be divergent in the country’s currency units almost all the time - that is, 
on average, the higher is one’s initial earnings, the higher is one’s earnings gain in pesos or 
bolivares. 
 Throughout this paper, earnings mobility is measured as changes in real labor market 
earnings in local currency. We use both changes in earnings as well as changes in log- earnings 
(the latter to approximate proportional changes). We adopt two measures of initial advantage: one 
based on the reported initial level of earnings, and another one based on the component of earnings 
predicted by socio-demographic characteristics permanently attached to the worker. This last 
measure is a proxy of longer-term advantage, and permits a mobility analysis that is less sensitive 
to transitory changes in earnings and to measurement error. 
 For the most part, to the extent that earnings gains and losses of different income groups in 
positive growth and negative growth periods have been studied in Argentina, Mexico, and 
Venezuela, the answers have mainly relied on comparable cross sections [16]. In this way, 
researchers have looked at anonymous individuals and households: e.g. those in the poorest 20 % 
of the income distribution versus others, thus comparing the evolution of income distribution 
through the use of growth incidence curves. This type of analysis does not link changes in 
inequality with the evolution of individual incomes over time. 
 In contrast, in this paper, we look at panel data and calculate earnings changes for each 
panel person, thus removing anonymity. The study of mobility patterns in labor markets in 
developing economies is still a fresh area of research where much remains to be learned; see [6] 
for a review of the literature on developing countries in general and our paper [13] for Latin 
American countries in particular.1 More recent studies for these economies include Fields and 
Sanchez Puerta [14], Cuesta et al. [9] and Krebs et al. [22]. 
 
3 Data and economic context 
Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela are chosen for our mobility study both for reasons of data 
availability and for inherent interest. The available data sets permit the same questions to be 
answered in a consistent manner in each of the three countries. We are able to measure the changes 
in real earnings from a given month in one year to the corresponding month a year later. These 
one-year-long panels begin in 1996 for all urban Argentina, in 1987 for all urban Mexico, and in 
1994 for all Venezuela. Moreover, each country has a large number of comparable panels - seven 
in the case of Argentina, eighty-five in the case of Mexico, and fourteen in the case of Venezuela 
- ranging over widely different macroeconomic conditions. 
 The data sources for the three countries are similar in a number of respects. In each, the 
sample under investigation consists of men and women who were in the labor force both in a given 
survey and in a follow-up survey one year later. The dependent variables in each case are changes 
in labor earnings and changes in log-earnings from one year to the next. In each case, earnings are 
measured in real local currency units (i.e., 1999 pesos for Argentina, 2002 pesos for Mexico, and 
1996 bolivares for Venezuela). The surveys also contain information on a set of demographic 
characteristics like gender, age, education, and geographic region indicators that will be used to 
predict longer-term earnings (see Section 4 below). To capture earnings changes among workers 
and to exclude new labor force entrants and retirees, we limit the analysis to individuals aged 25 
to 60 in the base year. 
 For Argentina, the data used come from the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH or 
Permanent Household Survey), a rotating panel following urban households for a maximum of a 
year and a half. For the years used in this paper, the survey was conducted in May and October 
each year in provincial capitals and areas with more than 100,000 inhabitants for a total of 28 urban 
areas. Argentina is predominantly urban (86 %); just the May-to-May changes are used here. The 
urban areas surveyed represent 61 percent of the country and 71 percent of urban areas. The survey 
contains detailed questions on employment and incomes, together with information on household 
demographics, housing questions, and questions on education. The survey methodology changed 
after May: 2003; therefore, the years used in this paper are 1996-97 to 2002-03 for all urban 
Argentina. 
 For Mexico, the data used come from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU or 
National Urban Employment Survey), a survey conducted on urban households to trace labor 
market characteristics in urban areas. This survey is a rotating panel with quarterly data for five 
periods. In order to maintain consistent geographical coverage over time, the present analysis is 
based only on the cities that remain in the panel throughout the 1987-2010 period. The urban 
centers surveyed cover 35 percent of the total population and about 57 percent of the population 
living in areas with more than 15 thousand inhabitants. Although the coverage of the ENEU has 
expanded to now survey rural areas as well, we only use data on urban households since the rural 
panels didn’t exist for the first fifteen years of our data.2 In 2005 the ENEU was replaced by the 
Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Empleo (ENOE or National Survey on Occupation and 
Employment), which updated the questionnaire and the sampling scheme of the ENEU. However, 
for the most part the trends observed in the key variables used in this study remain comparable 
with the ones previous to 2005. 
 For Venezuela, the data source is the Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo (EHM or 
Household Sample Survey). This survey has been conducted twice a year since 1969. For this 
study, the data run from 1994-95 to 2003-2004. It is a nationwide survey, initially intended for 
measuring unemployment and other characteristics of the labor market.3 Currently, the EHM is a 
multipurpose survey that includes questions not only about labor market variables such as labor 
force participation, earnings and unionization but also about family composition and 
characteristics of dwellings. Every six months, one sixth of the sample is replaced by a new set of 
households from the same sampling cluster. This feature enables researchers to produce panel data 
for those dwellings that remain in the sample up to a maximum of six observation data points. 
Since the household identification code was not consistent during 1997-98 and 2000-02, these data 
points needed to be dropped. 
 
 
 
3.1 Growth and Inequality Index  
Before presenting the empirical methods followed in this paper, we briefly discuss the evolution 
of GDP growth and earnings inequality for our three countries. More details can be found in the 
supporting Online Appendix of the paper. 
 Unfortunately, during our periods of study our three economies experienced not only 
positive economic growth but severe economic downturns. Between the years 1996 and 2003, the 
Argentinean economy experienced extraordinary macroeconomic variability. During the mid-
nineties it experienced moderate growth followed by a recession at the end of the decade and a 
severe collapse of the economy at the end of 2001. In the case of Mexico, the economy experienced 
an upward trend in real GDP from 1987 to 1994 thanks to the liberalization reforms implemented 
in those years. In December 1994, the Peso crisis hit the economy and output suffered a sharp 
downturn, from which it started recovering rapidly. From 1997 onwards, the Mexican economy 
continued its slow growth, with temporary downturns around the years 2001-2002 and 2009. 
Finally, the Venezuelan economy experienced years of moderate economic growth from 1995 to 
1997 and from 2000 to 2001. Each of these growth episodes was followed by a moderate to severe 
contraction. By the fourth quarter of 2002 the economy rebounded and in 2003 it experienced one 
of the highest growth rates of the decade. 
 During the years of this study, absolute and relative earnings inequality changed 
substantially in the three countries. Absolute inequality was fluctuating in Argentina and 
Venezuela, while in Mexico it had an inverted-V pattern. As for relative inequality, it rose steadily 
in Argentina with the exception of the last year, in Mexico it presented an inverted-V pattern, and 
in Venezuela different relative inequality measures display crossing patterns.  
 
4 Empirical Methods  
 The dependent variable in this study is one-year mobility for each country, i.e., change in 
earnings and log-earnings for the same individuals from a given month in one year to that same 
month a year later. Changes in log-earnings are used to approximate proportional changes. The 
analysis of these proportional changes is important because a given change in income will have a 
very different impact on well-being depending on whether the individual is poor or rich, e.g., 
during periods of economic decline a reduction in 100 pesos might represent a drastic change for 
a poor person, but not for a rich one. For unemployed individuals and individuals with zero 
earnings we impute them an earnings level of 1 peso/bolivar in order to avoid excluding them from 
the sample when conducting the analysis of log-earnings. 
 The data for one-year mobility are analyzed in a number of ways, depending on the 
hypothesis being tested. The tests for divergence or convergence are based on a) a pooled sample, 
which uses all of the one-year-long panels, as well as b) each individual panel. The tests for 
symmetry/asymmetry involve a comparison of all of the positive-growth years with all of the 
negative-growth years. 
 
4.1 Earnings dynamics and the divergence of earnings hypothesis 
We start by displaying quintile mobility profiles. These tables show the relationship between 
earnings and log-earnings change and initial reported earnings quintile groups, over the whole 
sample and for periods of growth and decline separately. They are the mobility have larger earnings 
(or log-earnings) changes and whether these patterns are consistent over periods of growth and 
recession. 
 Next we perform a regression analysis over each of our yearly panels to test in more detail 
the divergence of earnings hypothesis. To motivate this analysis consider the following simple 
earnings dynamics model. 
 Let Yt denote the earnings of an individual in the population at time t.
4 As previously 
mentioned, our goal is to estimate how an initial advantage in earnings relates to earnings changes. 
With our data containing individual observations for two periods one year apart, it is natural to 
formulate a population regression model like 
                                                              ∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡−1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑡                                                            (1) 
The parameters of this model provide an answer to the question of whether initially advantaged 
individuals (in terms of earnings) are getting ahead faster than the rest, or alternatively whether 
the earnings of poorer and richer workers are converging. In particular, the population parameter 
𝛽1 measures the expected difference in ∆𝑌𝑡 for two individuals who differ by one peso or bolivar 
in their initial earnings. If 𝛽1 < 0 it means that earnings changes are negatively related to initial 
earnings, in which case from one year to the next we would observe convergence in the incomes 
of initially advantaged and disadvantaged workers. If, on the other hand, 𝛽1 >0, this would signify 
greater earnings gains the greater is initial advantage and hence to a divergent process of earnings 
dynamics. Finally, if 𝛽1 = 0, earnings changes would on average be unaffected by the initial 
advantage of the worker. 
 While this model is simple and intuitive, we should be careful when interpreting it. In 
particular, it is possible to observe negative values of 𝛽1 if for instance workers are subject to 
individual transitory earnings shocks that wear out over time. In other words, in the short run we 
might observe that earnings are converging just because workers who received an initial positive 
(negative) earnings shock are now adjusting back to their lower (higher) permanent level of 
earnings, even if the longer-term earnings do not converge in general. Although strictly speaking 
this does not create any problem to the model in Eq. 1, we usually do not want to confound 
transitory adjustments in earnings with a more meaningful convergent process in earnings 
trajectories over a longer period of time. 
 To investigate whether convergence between rich and poor is taking place in a more 
permanent sense, we need to somehow eliminate the impact of earnings reverting to the conditional 
mean. Thus we need to come up with an operational definition of transitory earnings. To do so, we 
propose a simple model of earnings determination that can be estimated with short-lived panel 
datasets like ours. 
 In particular, we decompose Yt as the sum of a component related to characteristics 
permanently attached to the worker and another component that will be considered transitory 
earnings. In other words, we propose the model 
                                                                      𝑌𝑡 = 𝑍𝛾𝑡 + 𝛿𝜏𝑡 +∈𝑡 ,                                                             (2) 
 
where Z is a (1 x k) vector of observable socioeconomic characteristics permanently attached to an 
individual (like gender, age, education level, etc.), 𝛿 is a scalar capturing unobserved 
characteristics permanently attached to the individual, 𝛾𝑡 and 𝜏𝑡 are time-varying coefficients 
capturing the influence of these characteristics on earnings, and et is the transitory shock 
component previously mentioned. Thus, 𝑌𝑡
𝑝 = 𝑍𝛾𝑡 + 𝛿𝜏𝑡 forms the component of earnings 
associated with permanent characteristics of the worker, and the remaining ∈𝑡 will be dubbed 
transitory earnings. Note that we allow 𝑦𝑡
𝑝
 to be time-varying, since the coefficients associated to 
these permanent characteristics can change across periods. 
 To give empirical content to this model, we need to be explicit about the relation between 
each of these components. In particular, we assume that in the population these three components 
are uncorrelated among themselves, i.e., 
𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝑍𝑗 , 𝛿) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝑍𝑗 , ∈𝑡) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝛿, ∈𝑡) = 0∀𝑡, ∀𝑗= 1, … , 𝑘. 
Furthermore, we will assume that ∈𝑡 follows an AR(1) process, i.e.
5 
∈𝑡= 𝜌 ∈𝑡−1+ 𝑣𝑡          𝑣𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑 (0, 𝜎𝑣
2)          |𝑝| < 1. 
 The assumptions of uncorrelatedness between the different components of earnings imply 
that we cannot give a structural interpretation to the coefficient vector 𝛾𝑡. These assumptions are 
not too restrictive for the purpose at hand, insofar as we are not trying to estimate the returns to 
socioeconomic characteristics of the worker, but rather implement a decomposition of the 
embodied permanent advantage of workers. 
 The transitory earnings term will contain earnings shocks uncorrelated with the vector Z 
and the scalar 𝛿, which are the characteristics permanently attached to the worker. We implement 
this definition of transitory shocks because we lack a long series of yearly observations for each 
individual in the panel. If we had such a dataset we could in principle define as transitory those 
shocks whose effects die out over time or that are uncorrelated with some long-run trend in 
earnings.6 
 The AR (1) assumption made on this transitory shock is a common specification in the 
income mobility literature. Although many papers include more general ARMA (p,q) structures, 
such structures cannot be identified with our short-lived panels. 
 With this framework, we can now proceed in two stages, first estimating Eq. 2 in period   
t-1 to get the component of initial earnings associated with permanent characteristics of the worker 
and then using the predicted values of this regression in a second stage where we estimate the 
relationship between ∆𝑌𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑝
: 
                                                                    ∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑌𝑡−1
𝑝 + 𝑒𝑡.                                                         (3)   
 In Eq. 3, the parameter a1 captures how earnings changes are related to the component of 
initial earnings associated with permanent characteristics of the worker. Since this parameter is 
not affected by transitory shocks reverting to the mean, it will be a better measure of how earnings 
changes are related to a more permanent measure of initial advantage. 
In practice, we do not observe the unobserved individual-specific shocks contained in 8 in Eq. 2, 
which implies that we can only estimate in a first stage the component of earnings associated with 
observed permanent characteristics, namely 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑧 = 𝑍𝛾𝑡−1. However, given the orthogonality 
between 𝛿 and Z, it will suffice to know 𝑌𝑡−1
𝑧  in order to be able to consistently estimate 𝛼1 in a 
regression 
                                                               ∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑌𝑡−1
𝑧 + 𝑣𝑡                                                          (4) 
 This claim, as well as a full exposition of the econometric model is presented in detail in 
the Online Appendix of the paper. 
 In summary, we can use a Two-Stages Least Squares (2SLS) procedure to consistently 
estimate our parameter of interest 𝛼1, namely the impact of a more permanent measure of earnings 
on earnings changes. 
 In our empirical specification the vector z of observable permanent characteristics of the 
worker includes age, gender, education and region.7 
4.2 Testing the symmetry of gains and losses hypothesis 
As previously mentioned, we formulate the symmetry of gains and losses hypothesis, which is the 
idea that those earnings groups which experience larger positive earnings gains when the economy 
grows are the same as those that experience larger earnings losses when the economy contracts. 
 In the context of a regression equation like Eq. 1, which relates earnings changes to initial 
earnings we can test whether there is symmetry of gains and losses for each of our countries by 
pooling the data from several panels for years of growth and recession for a given economy. In 
particular, we can estimate a model 
                                                     ∆𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐺 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑁𝐺 + 𝑢,                              (5) 
where NG is a dummy indicating whether in the year in which earnings changes are being 
considered, GDP growth was negative.8 In other words, this model assumes that earnings changes 
during periods with positive growth are given by the equation 
∆𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑢, 
while during periods with negative growth the equation is 
∆𝑌 = (𝛽0 + 𝛽2) + (𝛽1 + 𝛽3)𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑢. 
With an equation like Eq. 5, we can test the aforementioned symmetry of gains and losses 
hypothesis. In particular, if during a period of positive growth richer individuals experience the 
largest earnings gains, i.e. if 𝛽1 > 0, then symmetry would imply that it is also the rich that lose 
the most during periods of negative growth. In terms of our Eq. 5, this would mean that 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 <
0, or simply 𝛽3 <  −𝛽1 < 0. 
 Similarly, if during a period of positive growth the richer individuals experience the 
smallest earnings gains, i.e. if 𝛽1 < 0, then symmetry of mobility would imply that it is also the 
richer individuals who lose the least during periods of negative growth. In terms of our Eq. 5, this 
would mean that 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 > 0, or 𝛽3 > −𝛽1 > 0. 
 These two conditions can be tested with a one-tailed t-test over the parameters estimated 
from Eq. 5. In particular we can test the symmetry of gains and losses hypothesis by testing the 
following one-sided hypotheses: 
Parameter H0 H1 
𝛽1 > 0  𝛽1 + 𝛽3 ≤ 0  𝛽1 + 𝛽3 > 0 
 𝛽1 < 0  𝛽1 + 𝛽3 ≥ 0  𝛽1 + 𝛽3 < 0 
 
Since these are tests for a linear combination of the parameters  𝛽1 and 𝛽3 they can be performed 
with a one-sided t-test with n – k – 1 degrees of freedom. The specific form of the t-statistic is the 
following 
where sgn (x) is a function that takes value 1 if x is positive, 0 if x = 0, and -1 if x < 0. By pre-
multiplying the ratio by the sign of 𝛽1 we ensure this statistic will be positive if the estimated 
patterns are asymmetric. 
A rejection of the null will be taken as evidence of asymmetric mobility patterns over the business 
cycle.9 
4.3 Robustness checks  
 4.3.1 Measurement error 
So far we have assumed that earnings were measured without error. However, based on validation 
data in developed countries, we know that this assumption is seldom true. Furthermore, 
measurement error in earnings is rarely just random noise as the traditional Classical Measurement 
Error model used to assume (see Bound et al. [8]). 
 The analysis of the impact of a general form of measurement error on the regression 
estimates of Eq. 1 has been presented in detail in Gottschalk and Huynh [19]. Using data for the 
U.S.A., the authors find that measurement error leads to a substantial understatement of inequality 
(due to mean reversion in the measurement error), but estimates of our parameter 𝛽1 in Eq. 1 are 
largely unaffected by such error when dealing with a model of log-earnings. 
 The reason for such a lack of impact on the OLS estimates of Eq. 1 with log-earnings is 
that with nonclassical measurement error, the attenuation effect on the parameter estimates is offset 
by the strong correlation between measurement errors across periods. 
 The consequences of nonclassical measurement error on the estimates arising from the 
model in Eq. 4 are derived analytically in the Online Appendix of the paper. From that derivation 
we can conclude that measurement error will have no impact on the estimates of 𝛼1as long as this 
error is uncorrelated with the observed permanent characteristics included in the vector Z. 
 To the extent that a substantial part of the measurement error occurs due to reactions to 
transitory fluctuations in earnings (see Bound et al. [7], and Gottschalk and Huynh [19]), it is 
plausible that the inconsistency in our 2SLS estimates when earnings are measured with error is 
small. 
 Nevertheless, lacking any validation data for our countries (and for any developing country 
to the best of our knowledge), we cannot judge whether the conclusions found by Gottschalk and 
Huynh for Eq. 1 or the conditions mentioned in the previous paragraph hold in our data. At best, 
we can report on the analytical implications of a general form of measurement error on our 
estimates and refer to the available empirical evidence for developed nations. 
 Other methods for dealing with measurement error in the context of earnings changes 
regressions include instrumenting using either second measurements of earnings or variables that 
are caused by earnings [17] and constructing pseudo-panels and tracking the mobility of average 
cohort earnings [4].10 While these papers correctly point out that 2SLS does not necessarily leads 
to consistent estimates of 𝛽1 in the presence of measurement error, we contend that the parameter 
𝛼1 is an interesting economic object on its own, one that on many occasions can be even more 
interesting than the original 𝛽1 itself.
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 In particular, 𝛼1 provides an estimate of how earnings changes are related to a more 
permanent measure of initial advantage, and hence it gives a measure of mobility cleaner from the 
mean-reverting impact of transitory shocks and cleaner from measurement error too. 
 4.3.2 Additional specifications 
In addition to the methods previously discussed, we estimated four additional models. 
 One robustness check we performed was to estimate the model in Eq. 4 adding sector of 
economic activity (formal/informal) as a regressor among the set of characteristics of the worker 
included in the vector Z. Although for many individuals, the sector of economic activity will be a 
transitory state, for some others it will be more permanent as they will tend to stay in one sector 
for most of their active life. 
 An alternative method that we explored involved approximating the individual’s longer- 
term earnings by averaging their earnings over several periods observed in the panel. This method 
captures the impact of both observable factors and unobservable time-invariant characteristics and 
it will work best if the panel has many observations per individual (i.e. if T is large) and if these 
observations are spaced widely over time. Under these conditions the effects of transitory income 
fluctuations and measurement error would be averaged out and their impact would be minimal. 
We performed these estimations but do not regard them as our preferred specification because in 
our case T is not very large and the time observations are close to one another.12 
 We also estimated our key models dropping from the sample the individuals who had 
earnings equal to zero in either the initial or the final period. 
 Finally, we estimated an alternative version of our predicted model where we “purged” 
earnings of life-cycle effects before estimating Eq. 4. 
 
5 Results  
5.1 Mobility profiles 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide a first exploration of the mobility data and give preliminary answers to 
the questions posed in Section 1. In these tables we display mobility profiles for the population 
classified according to their quintile group in the initial earnings distribution. This exercise is 
presented for earnings in levels for all years pooled together.13 
 In these mobility profiles, we observe that for all the countries larger positive gains (smaller 
negative losses) are observed for individuals at the bottom of the initial period earnings 
distribution. This evidence goes against the divergence hypothesis.14 
 As a first test of the symmetry hypothesis, these same tables also separate out periods of 
positive and negative GDP growth. We find convergent earnings changes in both the positive 
growth and the negative growth periods. This is evidence against the symmetry of gains and losses 
hypothesis, since the same income groups that gain the most when positive growth takes place are 
the ones who gain the most (lose the least) when there is negative growth. 
5.2 Regression-based tests: divergence of earnings 
A more precise test of the divergence of earnings hypothesis is obtained by estimating Eq. 1, 
namely regressing earnings change on initial reported earnings for each country for each one-year 
panel under the assumption of linearity. These point estimates, along with their 95 % confidence 
intervals, are reported in the left column of Fig. 1. The right column of that same figure presents 
the estimates for the regression for changes in log-earnings on initial log-earnings. In all years and 
for all countries, the regression coefficients are significantly negative. Thus, when initial reported 
earnings and log-earnings are used as a measure of initial advantage, in all three countries, it is 
those with the lowest initial reported earnings who exhibit the largest average earnings gains. The 
divergence of earnings hypothesis for initial reported earnings is decisively rejected by this test. 
 As noted above, this negative relationship between earnings change and initial earnings 
could be the result of earnings in any given year adjusting back to their longer-term levels after a 
transitory shock. This negative relationship could also be the result of measurement error. 
 Accordingly, we approximate longer-term earnings using the prediction method described 
in Section 4 and use these as regressors in the earnings change Eq. 4. The regression coefficients 
for this exercise are plotted in Fig. 2, on the left side for earnings change in currency units on initial 
predicted earnings in currency units, and on the right side for change in log-earnings on initial 
predicted log-earnings. 
 
 The results using predicted earnings differ qualitatively from the ones using initial reported 
earnings and also differ across the three countries. In the case of Argentina, earnings change is 
usually related significantly to predicted earnings, and all of the significant coefficients are 
negative. Thus, in Argentina, the results using predicted earnings confirm the results using initial 
reported earnings: divergence is rejected in favor of convergence or neutrality of earnings changes. 
A similar conclusion is obtained when looking at proportional earnings changes as approximated 
by changes in log-earnings. However, in the case of Mexico, earnings change is related 
significantly to predicted earnings only occasionally, and the coefficients change sign. Thus, in 
Mexico, convergence always appears for initial reported earnings; but for predicted earnings, the 
earnings changes are significantly convergent in a small number of cases, especially after the 1994 
Peso crisis, significantly divergent in a small number of cases, and insignificant in the great 
majority of cases. 
 
In the log-earnings specification, most of the coefficients for Mexico are statistically insignificant. 
Finally, in the case of Venezuela, the results for predicted earnings are also mixed: earnings change 
is significantly and negatively related to predicted earnings in seven panels, significantly and 
positively related to predicted earnings in one panel, and insignificant in six panels. In contrast, 
most of the coefficients in the model with predicted proportional changes are statistically 
insignificant. When using predicted earnings as explanatory variable, coefficients become much 
smaller, within the [-0.3, 0.3] range, and non-significant in many cases; rather than the [-0.8, -0.3] 
range observed when using reported initial earnings. In other words, the strong convergence 
patterns become much weaker or even neutral. 
 The fact that for Mexico and Venezuela, several coefficients of the predicted earnings 
variable are negative and statistically significant when working with earnings in levels but 
 
insignificant when working with the logarithmic specification indicates that in those periods 
earnings changes were negatively related to our constructed measure of longer-term earnings 
advantage, yet the losses were proportional to predicted longer-term advantage.15 
  
 In sum, in our three countries, the divergence hypothesis for earnings receives no support 
at all when using initial reported earnings and only infrequent support when using predicted 
earnings in pesos or bolivares. In particular, when using initial reported earnings in each country, 
we find significant convergence both in logs and in levels. When using predicted permanent 
earnings, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero in most cases, and only in very few 
cases do we find statistically significant divergence in earnings. 
5.3 Regression-based tests: symmetry of gains and losses 
As already discussed, our three countries all experienced periods of economic growth as well as 
periods of economic decline. The second question is whether when positive growth and negative 
growth years are compared, those income groups for whom earnings changes are the most positive 
when the economy is growing are those for whom earnings changes are the least positive or the 
most negative when the economy is contracting. When the pattern of gains and losses is not 
symmetric, we adopt the following terminology: if the same individuals gain significantly more 
regardless of whether the economy is growing or contracting, the pattern of gains and losses is said 
to be “structural.” Alternatively if the gains for different groups are not significantly different from 
one another in positive growth and/or in negative growth periods; such a pattern is said to be 
“insignificant.” 
 
 
 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 present the estimations of Eq.5 
∆𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑌0 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐺 + 𝛽3𝑌0 ∗ 𝑁𝐺 + 𝑢, 
for earnings in levels and in logarithms using initial reported earnings and predicted earnings as 
alternative measures of initial advantage. To reiterate, these regressions are estimated using 
pooled data across all years for each economy. Empirically, we observe that the parameter ß1 
measures the relation between earnings changes and initial earnings during periods of positive 
economic growth. A quick look across our results tables shows that for virtually all years and all 
of our econometric specifications, there is convergence (i.e. 𝛽1 < 0) during periods of economic 
growth.16 
 Given the finding of convergence during periods of economic growth, if symmetry of gains 
and losses is to hold, then we must have divergence in periods with negative growth, i.e.,  
 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 ≥ 0, or equivalently  𝛽3 ≥ −𝛽1 > 0. In Tables 4, 5 and 6 the coefficient  𝛽3 appears either 
under the label “Initial y*NG” or “Initial ln(y)*NG”. 
 Looking first at the results in levels (i.e., pesos or bolivares), the coefficient is always 
negative. We can thus infer that earnings changes are not symmetric if we look at the specifications 
using earnings (either reported or predicted) in levels. 
 Turning to the logarithmic specifications, we see that only in the case of predicted log-
earnings in Venezuela does the condition  𝛽3 ≥ −𝛽1 > 0 hold. To formally test the symmetry 
hypothesis we perform the t-test proposed in Eq. 6. The results for this test are presented in Table 
7. There we see that in nearly all the specifications, earnings changes are asymmetric, namely the 
income groups that gain the most (lose the least) during periods of economic growth are the same 
ones that gain the most (lose the least) during periods of economic downturn. There are two 
exceptions, which correspond to the specification for predicted log-earnings in Venezuela and 
Mexico. As previously mentioned in the case of Venezuela there is divergence in predicted log-
earnings during periods with negative growth and convergence during periods with positive 
growth. In the case of Mexico (under this same specification) there is convergence throughout but 
the convergence coefficient for periods with negative growth is not statistically significant, so we 
cannot reject the hypothesis of symmetry. 
 
 We have obtained three main findings. First, using pooled data, both for levels and logs, 
and reported earnings we observe strong convergence (i.e. a coefficient around -0.50) but no 
evidence of symmetry in any country. Second, using pooled data and our preferred specification 
with predicted permanent earnings, we find evidence of weak convergence (i.e., a coefficient in 
the range [-0.1, 0.0]), but no evidence of symmetry when using changes in levels. Third, when 
using changes in logs we still find weak convergence in all countries, but we fail to reject the 
symmetry hypotheses in Mexico and Venezuela. Divergence and symmetry of mobility are 
overwhelmingly rejected. 
5.4 Reconciling the panel and cross-section results 
The reader may have noticed a seeming contradiction. We have mentioned that crosssectional 
absolute and relative inequality had ups and downs in each of our three countries. However, we 
have also found in the panel data analysis that the mobility patterns are nearly always convergent 
or neutral, rarely divergent. The cross-sectional inequality findings mean that during several 
periods those anonymous individuals at the upper end of the earnings distribution gained at least 
as much in pesos or bolivares, as those at the lower end of the earnings distribution. On the other 
hand, the mobility evidence compiled from analysis of panel data means that among those 
particular individuals who are followed over time, those who started at the lower end of the 
earnings distribution gained at least as much in pesos or bolivares as those who started higher in 
the earnings distribution. How can these two findings be reconciled? 
 It is important to note, contrary to what many observers may believe, that convergent 
mobility does not imply falling inequality. For instance, Furceri [15] and Wodon and Yitzhaki [31] 
both show that “beta-convergence” (a negative relationship between change in log-income and 
initial log-income) is mathematically compatible with “sigma- divergence” (i.e., rising inequality 
as measured by the variance of logs). A detailed reconciliation between different measures of panel 
income change and relative inequality change is presented in Duval-Hernandez et al. [12]. In that 
work it is shown that rising inequality can be compatible with convergent earnings changes if 
earnings changes are large enough so that some individuals switch positions in a widening income 
distribution.17 
 To examine this mechanism, we explore more closely what happens with the distributions 
of earnings and earnings changes. In particular, for each country we select a period with rising 
absolute and relative inequality and positive economic growth, and we examine the distribution of 
earnings looking at the individuals anonymously and in a panel setting. For these periods in the 
three countries, we perform two sets of calculations. 
 The first set of calculations, presented in Fig. 3, displays the initial and final period log-
earnings of 27 illustrative individuals. To select these individuals, we split the population 
according to the quintiles of the initial period earnings distribution, and then for each quintile group 
we randomly select an individual located at the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentile of a given 
quintile group.18 We also select two individuals non-randomly, namely, the one individual with 
the highest initial earnings and the one with the highest final earnings. We plot the location of 
initial period log-earnings (top line) and final period log-earnings (bottom line), looking at the 
distributions anonymously (left column) and tracking individuals over time (right panel).19 
 As previously mentioned, relative and absolute inequality rose in these periods. Yet behind 
the rise in inequality, the figure tracking individuals over time reveals two important facts, namely: 
a) earnings change substantially for a minority of earners, and b) most of these large earnings 
changes occur in a crossing pattern, resulting in convergent mobility. 
 In other words, part of the reason why we find non-divergent earnings in spite of studying 
periods with rising inequality is that in the panel distribution of earnings there are a few individuals 
experiencing large reversals of fortunes. Whether such large reversals of fortunes are due to 
transitory shocks, measurement error, or some other more lasting force is something that deserves 
further research in countries with more observations on individuals’ incomes over time and, 
ideally, with both survey and administrative data. 
 The second set of calculations includes the full samples for the selected panels. For each 
country, we have classified workers in two ways, a cross-sectional approach and a panel data 
approach. The cross-sectional approach classifies workers into those belonging to the top quintile 
of real earnings in each year according to their earnings in that year and everyone else; it then 
calculates the mean earnings gain for these two cross-sectional (or anonymous) groups. The 
results, presented in column 2 of Table 8, show that in each country the cross-sectional top quintile 
group always gained the most. By contrast, the panel data approach classifies workers according 
to their initial earnings, and average earnings changes over time are then calculated for those 
individuals who started in the top quintile group and the bottom 80 % regardless of where they 
ended up. The pattern from this second approach, presented in the last column of that table, is the 
exact opposite to the previous one, namely in each country the panel people who gained the most 
were those who started in the lowest earnings quintiles. Remember: these calculations are for the 
exact same people. What differs is the method for calculating earnings changes, not the sample of 
earners. 
 In summary, not only can cross-sectional methods and panel data methods produce 
qualitatively opposite pictures of who gains the most when economic growth takes place but they 
do produce qualitatively opposite pictures for our three countries. 
 
 
 
6 Conclusions  
In this paper, we have used panel data for Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela to ask who has 
larger earnings changes in local currency units: those who started at the top of the distribution or 
those who started at the bottom? Given that economic growth was positive in most years and that 
relative earnings inequality rose often, and given our sense that most people remain 
approximately where they began within the income distribution, we expected to find two patterns 
in panel data: first, that earnings changes would be divergent in percentages on several 
occasions, and second that earnings changes would be divergent in pesos or bolivares all or 
nearly all the time - that is, on average, the higher is initial earnings, the higher is mean earnings 
gain in national currency units. But we found the opposite: convergent earnings changes in pesos 
or bolivares nearly all the time. Try though we might to get a predominantly divergent pattern of 
earnings changes in the three countries using a number of different specifications, we could not. 
Divergence is not the norm; convergence is. Specifically, we found that the divergence of 
earnings hypothesis receives no support at all when looking at a measure of initial reported 
earnings (or log-earnings). When we used a measure of predicted earnings that approximates 
longer-term earnings (and hence is less sensitive to mean-reverting transitory shocks) we 
obtained only scant support for the divergence hypothesis in the case of Mexico and Venezuela 
and no support at all in the case of Argentina. Most of the changes in earnings were either 
unrelated or negatively related to this measure of longer-term advantage. 
 We also tested whether the income groups that gain the most when the economy is 
growing are the ones that gain the most or gain the least when the economy is contracting. 
Support for the hypothesis of symmetric mobility was found only in Venezuela and for only one 
of the econometric specifications, namely the model of log-predicted earnings. In Mexico, for 
that same specification, we found no statistically significant pattern. In all other specifications, 
rather than symmetry, we found that earnings changes were “structural” in the sense that poorer 
individuals gained more than others regardless of whether the economy was growing or 
contracting. Therefore, in our three countries, the symmetry of mobility hypothesis was 
overwhelmingly rejected. 
 Finally, contrary to common perception, our research shows that periods of rising 
inequality are not necessarily associated with divergence in earnings among a panel of people, 
either unconditionally or after controlling for the potential confounding effects of transitory 
shocks adjusting back to the mean and of measurement error. 
 Overall, the analysis performed in this paper shows that much can be learned by 
analyzing panel data, knowledge that would not have been obtained by analyzing comparable 
cross sections. In the future, researchers would do well to perform both panel data analysis and 
cross-section analysis. Both types of analysis are meaningful. They are, however, different from 
one another. 
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